These are in reverse-order, so the newest posts will always be at the top. The dates are when the post was first made.
Readings are in a restricted part of this site. The username and password will be announced to participants at the start of class.
- Mon Nov 29
Thanks for your final papers. As a reminder, our final exam will be on Thursday Dec 9 in our normal classroom, in person and starting at 8 am (not 10 am). Here again is a preview of what the final will look like.
Here is a third review sheet for the class (earlier review sheet 1 and review sheet 2).
If you haven’t already done so, please submit your evaluations and feedback on this course. You should already have been emailed instructions about how to do so (about two weeks ago), or you can use this link. Your input will be accepted until the end of the day on Wednesday.
Here are lecture notes on externalism.
On Wednesday, we’ll begin with any questions you want to explore or review about the material from the last few weeks (Searle, Jackson’s Mary, and Putnam’s externalism). Then the floor will be open for anything you want to review/understand better from the whole course. So the best way to prepare for this meeting will be: (1) be sure you’re caught up with the reading on Putnam and today’s lecture notes, and (2) carefully go through the three review sheets for the course and come prepared to ask about material that your memory or understanding of is still fuzzy. When one of you asks “Can you explain X again?” I may sometimes invite proposals from you guys about answers, and then offer further clarifications if needed. This can help you review even more than just getting more words from me.
- Tue Nov 23
- Mon Nov 22
(Optional) Here is an interview with Jackson about the Mary argument, and why he’s nowadays changed his mind and become a physicalist.
No classes this Wednesday (Thanksgiving break). Papers can be turned in by the end of the day (midnight) on Sunday Nov 28.
Our reading and topic for discussion for the final week of classes will be an excerpt from Putnam’s paper The meaning of “meaning” — this is Chapter 47 in the most recent edition of the Chalmers anthology.
Optional supplementary reading on this final set of issues:
- Wed Nov 17
I emailed the class announcing that we won’t be meeting today (I’m sick).
On Monday, we’ll discuss Jackson’s Mary argument, but we’ll just spend that one day on the topic, rather than the two meetings we had scheduled. It would be best if you came to class on Monday having already thought seriously about the paper. Here are lecture notes and some additional reading:
There is a large philosophical literature on these issues; the above readings are just a taste.
Your papers were due this coming Tuesday Nov 23 (just before Thanksgiving break), but some of you may have hoped to meet with me today to discuss them. I don’t think I’ll be able to do that today. I’ve decided to give you all an automatic extension on the paper until the following Sunday, Nov 28. Some of you may still want to get your papers in before the break, but if it would help you to have the extra time, you’re welcome to use it. I’ll be available to discuss your paper plans on Monday (Nov 22) after class, and by Zoom the day before (Sun Nov 21) and the day after (Tue Nov 23). Email me if you want to have a Zoom meeting.
- Mon Nov 15
Today we continued our discussion of Searle, and briefly talked about Block’s article.
The fascinating fact that when we “think silently to ourselves,” in fact we are making tiny muscle movements in our larynx is called subvocalization and you can read more about it at that link. (Optional)
For next class, we’ll be discussing Jackson’s “Mary” or “Knowledge Argument.” The initial reading is Jackson’s Epiphenomenal qualia (1982) — this is Chapter 30 in the most recent edition of the Chalmers anthology, and our selection includes some passages from a follow-up article, “What Mary Didn’t Know” that Jackson published in 1986.
There are a bunch of short YouTube videos about Jackson’s Mary. (Thanks to Eesha for bringing some of them to my attention.) Here’s a few of them:
- Wed Nov 10
Here is a summary of the Mind’s I reading on Einstein’s brain. Here are some study questions to think and discuss.
First notes on Searle’s Chinese Room
The Chinese Room argument was referenced a few times in readings we did earlier in the class, for example section 11.6 of Block’s Mind as the software of the brain (we stopped reading before that), and at the end of Kim’s Chapter 5. Here is some optional further reading on it:
On Monday, we’ll continue discussing Searle’s argument, and will also talk about Block’s paper Troubles with Functionalism (already assigned below). Come to class also ready to discuss the Study Questions on the Einstein’s Brain paper (linked above, some of these questions are also among the third paper topics). And any questions you have from the second review sheets (posted on Monday).
- Mon Nov 8
Here are our last notes on mental causation, laws, and explanation
Here are notes on physicalism and reduction
Here are topics for your third papers, which are due by the end of the day on Tuesday Nov 23.
Here is a second review sheet for the class, which covers material between the first review sheet and where we are now.
Here is a preview of what the final will look like.
Readings for Wednesday (and continuing to next Monday):
(Optional) Here is an amazing article I came across about how intelligent some spiders can act.
- Wed Nov 3
Continuing with mental causation, laws, and explanation: here are lecture notes on events and causation and a summary of Davidson’s central ideas.
For Monday, I recommend re-reading the Davidson article. Also have a look at Kim Chapter 7. Some of this will be familiar from our earlier discussion of dualism and mental causation; some of it is specifically about the issues we’re exploring now. The material on the last two pages about “Twin Earth” gets into issues we’ll be exploring in a few weeks.
Here are some study questions on the Davidson article. By Monday, aim to understand the article well enough that you can answer these questions, or that you are at least prepared to ask questions to help clear up what’s still confusing and you’re not yet able to answer to your satisfaction.
- Mon Nov 1
Here is a summary of the Mind’s I selection you read for today (by Hofstadter).
Here are lecture notes on Hofstadter and Broad.
Here are lecture notes on laws, induction, and grue.
The next reading is Davidson’s article Mental events — this is Chapter 17 in the most recent edition of the Chalmers anthology. This may be one of the most challenging articles we read this semester, so expect to need to re-read it more than you do the normal readings. We’ll be discussing this over the next two classes.
Here are some questions about the Davidson article. You should aim to spend enough time reading and analyzing the article that you can answer these to your satisfaction.
- Wed Oct 27
Here are notes on Lewis’s article, and on some outstanding problems for functionalism.
One of the problems we talked about in class today was whether the causal role of some mental states (such as feelings or the way colors look to us) is essential to them, or could be swapped. Another problem was whether the causal roles that some functionalists want to identify with our mental states (so that they could still get to say that creatures with other hardware might be having the same mental states) could correctly be said to be causing our behavior. The identity theorists and the realizer functionalists argue that they can’t: only the actual hardware states realizing the roles really does the causal work.
We’ll be exploring these two objections further in the next weeks. We’ll begin with the second one, and start thinking more about what causation is and how mental causation works. In mid-November, we’ll then turn to the first objection, and think about swapped color experiences and Searle’s “Chinese Room”, which has been referenced a few times in our readings.
Read for Monday:
Minds I, Chapter 11
Broad, Excerpt from The Mind and its Place in Nature — this is omitted from the most recent edition of the Chalmers anthology. The book this selection was taken from was published in 1925, and some of the perspectives it advocates about chemistry and biology are now out-of-date. Many contemporary theorists would agree that chemical and biological facts can be surprising consequences of lower-level physical facts; but Broad is open to them not being even in principle deducible from the physics. There was probably more sympathy for that latter possibility in Broad’s time than there is now. In any case, the general issues Broad is discussing are still very much alive. To get a handle on his view about the relation between mental and physical facts, focus on the contrast he draws between on the one hand, predicting the properties of silver-chloride before you’ve ever combined those two elements, and on the other hand, predicting the behavior of a clock before you’ve ever seen one. What does Broad think the difference between these cases is? If the relation between mental and physical is more like the silver-chloride example than like the clock, how would that fit into the space of positions about the mind/body problem that we’ve been discussing?
- Mon Oct 25
Here are third lecture notes on functionalism.
Readings for Wednesday:
- Wed Oct 20
Here are second lecture notes on functionalism, covering most of what we discussed today.
Readings for the upcoming Monday (on Monday, had said these were for “some time over the next week”):
Add this third reading too:
- Kim Chapter 6 — The various “Objections and Difficulties” that Kim discusses at the end of his Chapter 6 (starting bottom p. 179) are things we’ll discuss later in the class. I encourage you to read them now though.
I also linked to the Stanford Encyclopedia article on functionalism, but this is only optional reading that might help you understand some of the positions and surrounding debates better.
- Mon Oct 18
Reminder: your papers are due by the end of tomorrow Tuesday Oct 19 (midnight).
Here are first lecture notes on functionalism, which we began discussing today.
Readings for Wednesday:
Readings for some time over the next week:
One topic that comes at up at the end of Kim’s Chapter 5 (and also at the end of Block’s paper, section 11.6) is Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument. We’ll talk about that in detail in a few weeks, but will postpone consideration of it until then. We’ll read Searle’s original paper then, and I’ll remind you to come back and read Kim’s and Block’s discussion.
- Wed Oct 13
Today we continued discussing logical behaviorism.
Read for Monday: Cory Doctorow’s story Truncat. (Think about: What would the mind have to be like, so that feeding it a computer program recorded from another person’s brain, and stored on a network, could give you some of the experiences and memories of the original subject?)
Reminder: your second papers are due Tuesday Oct 19.
- Mon Oct 11
Today we reviewed identity theory and began discussing logical/analytical behaviorism.
The readings for this week were posted below (the Kim chapter and the Putnam article).
Here are lecture notes on Behaviorism. We’ve only gone through some of this material today, and will continue talking through the rest on Wednesday.
- Wed Oct 6
Here are notes on Smart’s Identity Theory.
Comments and grades on the first papers are being returned now; if you don’t receive them by this evening, get in touch.
Here are topics for your second papers, which will be due Tuesday Oct 19.
Two of the new paper prompts are about identity theory, so you might be starting to think through more difficult/unclear issues than we discussed in today’s class. On Monday, I’ll begin by inviting any questions or ideas about identity theory you wanted to discuss as a group. But the main issues we’ll be discussing on Monday will be behaviorism, and considerations for and against it. Readings for this are posted immediately below (the Kim chapter and the Putnam article).
- Mon Oct 4
Today we talked about the first review sheet (linked below).
For Wednesday, we’ll begin discussing Smart’s identity theory (readings linked below). That discussion may carry over into part of Monday. But on Monday, I expect we’ll also begin discussing the alternative behaviorist theory. The readings for that material, which will occupy us all of next week, are:
- Wed Sept 29
Today we finished discussing Conceivability and Possibility.
On Monday, we’ll do a review of all the material we’ve covered so far. Here is a review sheet, which you should look over in advance, and come to class prepared with questions on things you’re unclear on.
Our next topic will then be Smart’s identity theory. The readings for that will be:
Depending on how much we discuss the review sheet on Monday, we may begin discussing these readings then; at latest, we’ll be discussing them by next Wednesday.
After a few classes on identity theory, we’ll then be discussing logical behaviorism. As I mentioned in an earlier class, we’re taking these two views up in reverse chronological order: behaviorism was developed and popular in philosophy before identity theory was, and many expositions of identity theory will talk about behaviorism as though it’s already been introduced. For our purposes in this class, though, I think it will work more naturally to discuss identity theory first, and then behaviorism second.
- Mon Sept 27
In class, we discussed sample philosophy papers: what problems they had, how they could be improved, and so on. (Now updated with comments on Paper 1.)
On Wednesday, we’ll continue our discussion of Conceivability and Possibility. (No new readings.) The class after that, we’ll do a review of all the material we’ve covered in class up to that point.
- Wed Sept 22
Today we continued discussing Conceivability and Possibility.
Next Monday we will discuss some sample philosophy papers. Read Paper 1 at that link and come to class ready to discuss what problems you think it has, and how it could be improved. Best to bring a printout or have access to an electronic copy of the paper, to help us discuss it as a group.
- Mon Sept 20
Today we started discussing Conceivability and Possibility.
Your papers are due by the end of Tuesday Sept 21 (midnight).
- Wed Sept 15
Today we discussed Huxley’s article in class. There are no lecture notes; but here is a video of a lecture by John Campbell at Berkeley on Huxley’s article and some questions about free will (optional viewing).
Reminder: your first papers are due Tuesday Sept 21.
In our next class, we’re going to start discussing what I called the “more promising” strategy of arguing for dualism. This proceeds from the premise that we can imagine our minds to exist without our body, and a principle that whatever we can imagine will in some sense be possible. Our discussion of this strategy will take a couple of classes. The only required reading will be a selection from Descartes’ Sixth Meditation where he pursues this strategy. Here are some lecture notes summarizing Descartes’ argument and introducing the issues we’ll be discussing.
For optional reading, if you’d like to understand more of the background context where Descartes is presenting this argument, you can have a look at:
When Descartes wrote the Meditations, he sent them out to various other intellectuals in Europe, some of whom were sympathetic to his arguments and others of whom thought the arguments weren’t very good. Some of these other intellectuals composed seven booklets of “Objections” to Descartes and Descartes in turn wrote “Replies” to the Objections. Some excerpts from the Objections and Replies are included in the readings above. However, Descartes also considers argumentative objections and replies to them even in his initial presentation. Sometimes he shifts between stating an objection and giving the reply even within a single paragraph. So important argumentative moves can happen within a sentence or two. Other times, several paragraphs in the text all constitute a single unit pushing in a single direction. Try to map out the dialectical structure of the Descartes readings. This may be a challenging exercise. Even if you get confused, try to at least form a hypothesis about what direction each sentence is pushing in, what it’s supposed to accomplish.
- Mon Sept 13
Notes on Causal arguments against dualism
On Wednesday we’ll read through the Huxley article as a group, identifying the structure of his discussion and what his arguments are, and talking about how persuasive they are. You should definitely have read this article, and taken notes on it, yourself, before we do this. Also bring a (paper or electronic) copy of the article to class.
Wednesday will also be an opportunity to ask questions about any other of our readings so far (such as van Inwagen or Kim).
After these exercises (perhaps starting at the end of Wednesday, but more likely next Monday), we’ll start discussing the more promising strategy of argument for dualism, relying not on Leibniz’s Law, but instead on the apparent link between our being able to imagine something and it’s being possible.
- Wed Sept 8
Today’s lecture notes:
Optional: here is more information about Leibniz (pronounced like the first syllable of “library”, then “nits”).
On Monday, we’ll start discussing arguments against dualism. The readings for next week continue to be the van Inwagen and Kim selections linked below, and also this additional paper by Thomas Huxley, published in 1874. This is Chapter 6 in the most recent edition of the Chalmers anthology.
- Tue Sept 7
Prof Pryor is getting over a cold (Covid test negative) so in the interest of everyone’s health will conduct tomorrow’s class by Zoom. (See links above, will also email to the class). Office hours will be after class as normal, also by Zoom.
Here are topics for your first papers, which will be due Tuesday Sept 21.
This coming Friday, Sept 10, our department is having an event Philosophy in 15 Minutes. It will take place from 3-5 pm in Gerrard Hall. After the talks and presentations, people can grab a wrapped snack, water/soda, and congregate outside of Gerrard Hall in the courtyard for further friendly conversation. Everyone is welcome, not only philosophy majors! Feel free to bring friends who may be curious about philosophy.
- Wed Sept 1
Summaries of what we discussed today in class, and some more:
We don’t meet on Monday Sept 6 (Labor Day). On Wed Sept 8, we’ll start considering arguments for dualism.
updated In addition to the van Inwagen selection linked below, also have a look at Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of Kim’s Philosophy of Mind textbook.
We’ll be discussing most of the issues that Kim and van Inwagen take up, but not in the same order that they do. Here’s some pointers about things they mention that we’ll be getting to later:
Kim pp. 8-14 discusses a notion “supervenience.” van Inwagen also discusses this (on pp. 154-5, where he says “mental changes must be physical changes,” and on pp. 180-3, where he talks about a physical duplicating machine), but he doesn’t use the word “supervenience.” We’ll be discussing this notion, too, but towards the end of September.
Kim pp. 35-46 presents a number of arguments for dualism. We’ll discuss versions of arguments 1-3 next week. We’ll discuss versions of arguments 5 and 7 near the end of September.
van Inwagen pp. 155-168 also presents some arguments for dualism. We’ll discuss many of these, but again not in the same order that he does. The issues about thinking beings that are physically very different from us (pp. 165 and following) we won’t get to until mid-October.
Kim pp. 46-56 discusses some arguments against dualism (see also van Inwagen pp. 152-4 and 178-top p. 180). We’ll discuss many of these in mid-September. The notions of “interactionism,” “epiphenomenalism,” and “overdetermination” belong to this group of topics.
the view called “identity theory” (or sometimes “type identity theory” or “type physicalism”) is a specific version of physicalism/materialism that we’ll be looking at more closely in early October
- Mon Aug 30
If you want to read more about free will, here are some notes that go much further than we will in class, for optional reading. If you want to read even further, here are two books that should be useful and accessible:
As I said last Wednesday, the reading from van Inwagen covers many issues that we’ll be discussing over the next classes, but not in the same order we’ll be going. Read this soon and read it several times.
- Wed Aug 25
Lecture notes on the Turing Test, which we began discussing today. Remaining to be discussed next class: the issues about “Machines only have fixed patterns of behavior, they can only do what they’re programmed to do!”, How to interpret the fact that a machine passed the Turing Test, and the question I had on the board about “If a machine passes the Turing Test, would you think it deserves as much respect/voting rights/etc as an adult human?”
Here’s a summary of issues raised in the Hofstadter dialogue.
No additional reading for Monday. We’ll continue discussing the Turing Test and whether and what follows from our choices being predetermined. In the next sequence of classes, we’re going to have a few where there isn’t reading directly assigned for each meeting. But this reading from Peter van Inwagen will present and bear on the issues we discuss through the whole sequence. So have a look at it when you get a natural opportunity to. This is one of the texts this term that will especially benefit from repeated readings. (Note that the selection doesn’t end at p. 168, it picks up again in the middle of p. 178, with “This completes our examination of arguments against physicalism. We now turn to arguments for physicalism.”)