HOWEVER, you should be cautious about feeling too comfortable with
these results. Thinking again of the truth-teller paradox, yes,
-<code>ω</code> is *a* fixed point for `I`, and perhaps it has
+<code>Ω</code> is *a* fixed point for `I`, and perhaps it has
some a privileged status among all the fixed points for `I`, being the
-one delivered by Y and all.
+one delivered by Y and all (though it is not obvious why Y should have
+any special status).
But one could ask: look, literally every formula is a fixed point for
`I`, since
of infinitely many---and not always the intuitively most useful
one. (For instance, the squaring function has zero as a fixed point,
since 0 * 0 = 0, and 1 as a fixed point, since 1 * 1 = 1, but `Y
-(\x. mul x x)` doesn't give us 0 or 1.) So why in the reasoning we've
+(\x. mul x x)` doesn't give us 0 or 1.) So with respect to the
+truth-teller paradox, why in the reasoning we've
just gone through should we be reaching for just this fixed point at
just this juncture?
referent of *this noun phrase*, then it is the referent of (3), and so
for any object.
+The chameleon nature of (3), by the way (a description that is equally
+good at describing any object), makes it particularly well suited as a
+gloss on pronouns such as *it*. In the system of [Jacobson 1999]
+(http://www.zas.gwz-berlin.de/mitarb/homepage/sauerland/jacobson99.pdf)
+pronouns denote (you guessed it!) identity functions...
+
Ultimately, in the context of this course, these paradoxes are more
useful as a way of gaining leverage on the concepts of fixed points
and recursion, rather than the other way around.