-Here's the idea: since people can have different attitudes towards
-different propositions that happen to have the same truth value, we
-can't have sentences denoting simple truth values. If we did, then if John
-believed that the earth was round, it would force him to believe
-Fermat's last theorem holds, since both propositions are equally true.
-The traditional solution is to allow sentences to denote a function
-from worlds to truth values, what Montague called an intension.
-So if `s` is the type of possible worlds, we have the following
-situation:
+First, the familiar linguistic problem:
+
+ Bill left.
+ Cam left.
+ Ann believes [Bill left].
+ Ann believes [Cam left].
+
+We want an analysis on which the first three sentences can be true at
+the same time that the last sentence is false. If sentences denoted
+simple truth values or booleans, we have a problem: if the sentences
+*Bill left* and *Cam left* are both true, they denote the same object,
+and Ann's beliefs can't distinguish between them.
+
+The traditional solution to the problem sketched above is to allow
+sentences to denote a function from worlds to truth values, what
+Montague called an intension. So if `s` is the type of possible
+worlds, we have the following situation: