"Study Questions" on Kripke


1. Kripke cites three arguments which are alleged to support the
Frege-Russell or "descriptivist" view of how ordinary names work.
(One of these he calls the "basic problem"; the other two he calls
"subsidiary arguments.") What are these arguments?

2. Kripke describes an amendment to the Frege-Russell view of how
names work, according to which names aren't associated with
particular descriptive conditions, but rather with a family or
cluster of descriptive conditions. How does this amendment work? Why
would one want to make this amendment--what problem is it supposed to
solve?

3. How does Kripke understand talk of "possible worlds" and of "the
same thing" existing in different possible worlds?

4. What does it mean to say that a name is a "rigid designator"?

5. (a) What is the difference between the claim that a description
"fixes the reference" of a name, and the claim that the description
"gives the meaning" of the name?
(b) If a description gives the meaning of the name, is the name a
rigid designator or not? How about if the description merely fixes
the reference of the name?
(c) In Kripke's view, could an account of names which said that
descriptions merely fix the reference of names draw support from all
of the arguments mentioned in question 1, above?

6. Near the end of Lecture I and at the start of Lecture II, Kripke
has some arguments concerning the names "Aristotle" and "Moses." What
are these arguments supposed to show? How do the arguments work?