Philosophy 257 Behavior and Other Minds

Asst. Prof James Pryor Dept. of Philosophy

Syllabus

1. Introduction
   • The impoverished epistemology of other minds employed by the radical interpreter

     Readings

     Davidson, "Radical Interpretation"

     Jackson and Pettit, "Some Content is Narrow"

   • Modest foundationalism about the external world: can we extend such an epistemology to other minds?

     Readings

     McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge"

     Pryor, "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist"

2. The Argument from Analogy

   Readings

   Mill selection

   Russell selection

   Ayer, "One's Knowledge of Other Minds"

3. Austin and Relevant Alternatives

   Optional Readings

   Stine, "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure"

   Cohen, "Skepticism and Everyday Knowledge Attributions"

   Cohen, "How To Be a Fallibilist"

   Austin, "Other Minds"

   Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism Ch. 2

4. Malcolm, Criteria, and Some Critics

   Readings

   Notes on Criteria

   Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds"

   Optional: Craig's excellent overview of the Private Language Argument

   Williams' review of Shoemaker, Problems of the Self Ch. 8

   Chihara and Fodor, "Operationalism and Ordinary Language"

   Putnam, "Other Minds"

   Problems for Inference to the Best Explanation Views

5. Strawson's Appeal to Criteria

   Readings

   Strawson's Individuals Ch. 3

   Optional: Shoemaker, "Self-reference and self-awareness" and "Introspection and the self," on the question of "identifying oneself"

   Optional: Kripke's "Wittgenstein and Other Minds," pp. XX on the "no-owner" view

   Williams' criticisms of Strawson, Problems of the Self Ch. 5 and pp. 120-26

6. Dummett's Appeal to Criteria
   • Varieties of Irrealism
   • Truth, Metaphysics, and Understanding
   • Dummett's Argument for Anti-Realism

     Readings

     Soames, "The Truth about Deflationism"

     Hale, "Realism and its Oppositions," sections 1-3

     Optional: Devitt, Realism and Truth, Ch. 14

   • Conditionals and Harman's "Dogmatism Paradox"

     Readings

     Piller, "Vann McGee's counterexample to modus ponens"

     Feldman, "In defense of closure"

     Sorensen, "Dogmatism, junk knowledge, and conditionals"

     Optional: Edgington, "On Conditionals"

   • Wright on whether the Dummettian Anti-Realist needs or should use a notion of criteria

     Readings

     Wright, "Second Thoughts About Criteria"

7. Shoemaker

8. Action Theory
   • The relation between movements and action. Do disputes in action theory bear on the epistemology of other minds?

Course Description