Review Sheet for Final

• valid argument, sound argument
• sufficient condition, necessary condition
• a "criterion" or practical test for X (the epistemology of X) vs. a definition or analysis of what we mean by X (the metaphysics of X) vs. a stipulative definition of X
• What is a thought-experiment? Why are science fiction examples relevant to philosophy?
• begging the question (as philosophers use this expression)
• equivocation
• dilemma
• reductio

• substance vs. property vs. process/activity
• process-based definitions of life vs. ingredient-based definitions
• Feldman's "Jonah objection" to vitalism

• mind vs. soul, which can a materialist believ in?
• what is a mental state? what is the difference or relation between a mental state and a mind?
• dualism vs. materialism/physicalism
• Descartes' Dreaming Argument
• Descartes' Cogito Argument
• the Meditation 2 argument that what I am is a thinking thing (a mind)
• the Meditation 6 argument that my mind is separate from my body

• Leibniz's Law
• Does Leibniz's Law say that if A and B have all the same properties, they are numerically identical?
• "I know that reporter is alive right now. I don't know whether Superman is still alive. Hence that reporter is not Superman."
• "I have no doubts about my own existence. I do have doubts about whether my body really exists. Hence I am not my body."
• examples of using Leibniz's Law to argue for dualism; examples using it to argue against dualism

• necessary facts vs. contingent facts
• epistemic possibility
• metaphysical possibility
• physical possibility, also called nomological possibility
• examples of claims which are necessary but such that someone might be able to conceive or imagine them false

• "my fist is not identical to my hand" vs. "my fist is separate from, and can exist without, my hand"
• what is supervenience? give examples where the A facts are claimed to fix/settle/determine the B facts

• Turing Test: what is it? what is passing it supposed to show?
• behaviorism
• counterfactual claims
• what is a disposition? the manifestation of a disposition? the categorical basis of a disposition?

• inverted color spectrums
• privileged access

• epiphenomenalism
• interactionism
• "the physical world is causally closed"
• causal "overdetermination"; why is it unattractive to say this happens everytime the mental causes a physical effect?
• the "remote control" argument against dualism

• using probability to describe your evidence/information vs. using probability to describe how show parts of the world (such as the past) objectively settle how the rest of the world has to be
• determinism vs. indeterminism; what is it for the laws of nature to be "deterministic"?

• What is a functional state? For instance, what makes something the ZERO state of a Coke machine?
• Causal Theory of Mind, functionalism
• "the mind is the brain" vs. "the mind is the brain's software": what do these slogans mean?
• multiple realizability

• representational states, intentionality
• Searle's Chinese Room Argument
• the "Systems Reply" to Searle

• numerical identity vs. qualitative identity
• intrinsic properties vs. extrinsic or relational properties
• essential properties vs. accidental properties
• the difference between intrinsic properties and essential properties
• the difference between intrinsic properties and important properties
• relation between Leibniz's Law and qualitative change
• Ship of Theseus
• conventionalism about personal identity

• brain transplant vs. "information transplant"
• teletransportation
• what is a person-stage? (comparison of stages in a person's life to innings in a baseball game)
• "genuine memory presupposes identity", the circularity objection to Proposal #4
• quasi-memory vs. memory
• psychological continuity
• direct psychological connections vs chains of psychological connections
• fission, fusion
• what does it mean for a relation to be transitive?
• what does it mean for a relation to be many-one, or to "allow branching"?
• the "psychological continuity + no competitors" view of personal identity
• "Identity should be an intrinsic matter, that is, intrinsic facts should settle how many people there are. It shouldn't depend on extrinsic facts!"
• the "bodily continuity" view of personal identity
• the "soul theory" of personal identity
• the "epistemic objections" to various proposals about personal identity
• to what extent does the choice of whether to be a dualist, or a functionalist, or some other kind of materialist, commit one to any of the specific views of personal identity we discussed?
• surviving in the strict philosophical sense vs. surviving in Parfit's sense (that is, having someone around who is psychologically continuous with you)
• Why think that "personal identity isn't what matters"?

• difference between the process of dying, the event of death, the state of being dead
• the Termination Thesis
• what does it mean to be essentially alive? is being essentially alive the same as being immortal?
• the possibility of destroying a bouquet of flowers without destroying any flowers
• Epicurus' argument that your own death isn't bad for you
• intrinsic vs extrinsic/derivative badness; comparative badness
• the Deprivation Account of the badness of death
• Lucretius' argument that it's unreasonable to regard no longer being alive as worse than not yet being alive
• what is hedonism? what are some examples of non-hedonistic theories of value ("axiologies")?
• acting for your own purposes vs acting for selfish purposes
• feeling good because you got what you aimed for vs aiming for feeling good