Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?

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IS INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE INCORRIGIBLE?

I

BY SENSE PERCEPTION we can become aware of the current state of our physical environment, including our own body. It is very natural to say that, in similar fashion, we can become aware of the current events in our own minds. Instead of turning outward to physical events, the mind turns inward on itself and perceives a procession of mental events. Locke spoke of the faculty of reflection, Kant spoke of inner sense, modern philosophy often speaks of introspection. I believe this traditional view to be essentially correct.

But, it is often held, introspection differs from sense perception in one very important respect. Introspective reports of current mental events are alleged to be logically incorrigible or logically indubitable. If I make the sincere statement "I seem to be seeing something green now," then, it is alleged, it is *logically impossible* for me to be mistaken in my statement. I may be lying, of course, but then I will know that my statement is untrue. For, it is argued, if mistake were a possibility then it would make sense to say "*I think* I seem to be seeing something green now, *but perhaps I am wrong*." But this is nonsense, it is said, and so introspection is logically incorrigible or logically indubitable. (In the rest of this paper I shall simply say "incorrigible" or "indubitable," and I shall use the two words interchangeably.)

Incorrigibility, or indubitability, must be distinguished from logical necessity. Whether or not the sincere statement "I seem to be seeing something green now" is incorrigible, it is certainly not logically necessary. This is most easily seen if we remember that a logically necessary truth is true in all possible worlds. Now we can certainly describe worlds where I do not seem to be seeing something green now. Contrariwise, it may be noted, a logically necessary statement need not be incorrigible. It is not true that we assent to any logically necessary statement as soon as we understand it. We may mistakenly think it is false. It took a long

time to convince Hobbes that Pythagoras' theorem followed of necessity from Euclid's axioms. Those who have said that logically necessary statements were incorrigible or indubitable either were wrong or else meant something different by "incorrigible" or "indubitable." (I suspect they meant "logically necessary.")

But although incorrigibility is not the same thing as logical necessity, it can be defined in terms of logical necessity. For we can say that a statement is incorrigible if and only if it is logically necessary that, when the statement is sincerely made, it is true. A statement is incorrigible when sincerity *entails* truth.

Often associated with the doctrine that current introspective reports are incorrigible is the view that each of us has a *logically privileged access* to our own mental experiences. Behavioral and physiological evidence logically cannot prevail against our own evidence. If my statement that I feel a pain now is sincere, it automatically outweighs any other evidence about my hedonic state. It may seem that this is the doctrine of incorrigibility all over again, but this need not be so. In his 1959 British Academy lecture, "Privacy," A. J. Ayer conceded that introspective reports were not incorrigible, but went on to maintain the doctrine of logically privileged access. I could be wrong in thinking that I seem to be seeing something green now, but if I am wrong, correction could come only, if it came at all, from *me*.

In this paper I shall advance arguments to show that introspective knowledge cannot be incorrigible or indubitable, and also that we do not have a logically privileged access to our mental existence. I shall concentrate on the former because, as I shall show, once the doctrine of incorrigibility is refuted, Ayer's compromise quickly breaks down. By way of penance, I will add that one of the philosophers I am attacking is Armstrong (*Perception and the Physical World*, especially Chapter 4, and *Bodily Sensations*, especially Chapter 9).

Before I go on to advance arguments, however, I shall declare my interest in the question. I wish to defend the thesis, recently advanced by J. J. C. Smart and others, that mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, states of the brain. Now if I accept the existence of introspection, as I also do, then I must conceive of both introspection and the objects of introspection as states

of the brain. Introspection must be a self-scanning process in the brain. That it is logically possible that such a self-scanning process will yield wrong results is at once clear, nor is it possible to see how such a self-scanning process could yield a *logically* privileged access. So if introspection is incorrigible, or if we have logically privileged access to our own mental states, it seems that a materialist doctrine of mental states must be false. (A similar line of argument against Smart is developed by Kurt Baier in "Smart on Sensations," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 40 [1962], 57-68.) I should hasten to add, however, that if my argument in this paper succeeds, I have done nothing positive to prove a materialist theory of mind. I shall therefore make no further mention of, and still less will I appeal to, this controversial doctrine of the nature of mind. What I say *here* may be true, even if that doctrine is false.

II

I shall open my case by advancing two closely connected arguments which do not strictly *disprove* the existence of incorrigible introspective knowledge, but which do cast the most serious doubt on its existence.

1. It seems clear that if there is incorrigible knowledge of our own mental states, then it cannot apply to the past, but only to the present. If I tell somebody about my mental experience yesterday, then it is quite clear that my report can be mistaken. What is more, although I am likely to be better able to say what those experiences were than anybody else, somebody else might be a better authority on them than I am. In order to see that this is so, consider the following imaginary case. Suppose I report (sincerely) that I was in pain a few seconds ago; but suppose also that my report is untrue. The fact that I was not in pain a few seconds ago might have been known at that time to a brain super-technician. Knowing the correlation between states of the brain and inner experiences, he was able to say with certainty that I was not in pain then. But then, using his art, he proceeded to interfere with the apparatus in the brain responsible for my memory of my past inner experiences. The result was that, in all

sincerity, I made the false report that I was in pain a few seconds ago. Now here a case has been described in which not only am I wrong about the nature of my experiences a few seconds ago, but the brain technician is a better authority than I am as to what they really were.

But if we consider such a report as "I was in pain a few seconds ago," is it not a paradigm of an *empirically* indubitable statement? We can hardly imagine, in any concrete way, what it would be like to make a mistake about it. Only by describing a quite fantastic situation, as we did above, can we make the notion of a mistake intelligible. The mistake may be logically possible, but it is empirically impossible. Now what the upholder of the logical indubitability of current introspective reports has to maintain is that the logical character of our certainty *changes* as we move from the past to the present. Remember here that the experience does not even need to have occurred some seconds ago for error to be (logically) possible. Place the experience the merest fraction of a second in the past, and it is intelligible to say that error has occurred. Are we prepared to say that this fraction of a second changes the nature of our certainty and that error, from being empirically impossible, becomes logically impossible? Admittedly I have said nothing here which is a *strict* disproof of the thesis of indubitability, but the argument gives us the strongest grounds for *suspecting* the thesis.

2. I shall now advance a second, closely connected argument with the same aim of sowing strong suspicion. Instead of reporting "I was in pain just then" I report "I am in pain now." Now if we take the view that the latter is a piece of indubitable knowledge, to what period of time does the word "now" refer? Not to the time before I started speaking, for there I am depending on memory, which can be challenged. Not the time after I finish speaking, for then I depend on knowledge of the future, which can be challenged too. The time in question must therefore be the time during which the report is being made. But then it must be remembered that anything we say takes time to say. Suppose, then, that I am at the beginning of my report. My indubitable knowledge that I am in pain can surely embrace only the current instant: it cannot be logically indubitable that I will

still be in pain by the time the sentence is finished. Suppose, again, that I am just finishing my sentence. Can I do better than *remember* what my state was when I began my sentence? So to what period of time does the "now" refer?

At this point it seems that the defender of indubitable introspective knowledge will have to introduce the notion of the "introspective instant." Let us consider first the more obvious notion of a "perceptual instant." Suppose a light is switched on and off very rapidly, so that we are *just*, and no more than just, able to follow every step in the cycle. We can say that, within this situation, the time that the light remains switched on or off is a "perceptual instant." It is the smallest unit of time visually discernible within that situation. In parallel fashion, the "introspective instant" would be the smallest unit of time discernible with respect to inner experiences. Now I think that the defender of indubitable introspective knowledge would have to say that our knowledge is indubitable only while it is knowledge of the current "introspective instant." During that instant we know indubitably what is going on in that instant, but past instants are only remembered and future instants only foreseen, so that doubt would be meaningful.

But the consequence of this is that the defender of incorrigibility will have to admit that it is in practice, if not in theory, impossible to make a *statement* of the required logical status about one's inner experiences. For, by the time one has finished speaking, the moment to which one was referring is in the past. Only if we could complete the statement within the "introspective instant" would it be beyond challenge. So what becomes of the alleged indubitability of the *statement* "I am in pain now" when I speak at ordinary speed? Is it in any different position from the *empirically* indubitable statements "I have a hand now" or "I was in pain a moment ago"? Special authority has to retreat from speech to the instant's awareness. And then we may well become skeptical whether there is any such logically privileged awareness. After all, the alleged indubitability was *established* by a consideration of *statements*. (See the second paragraph, above.)

3. Let us now go on, however, to consider arguments which, if valid, show that first-person reports of current experience *cannot*

be indubitable. There is one important line of argument that derives from Wittgenstein. If introspective mistake is ruled out by logical necessity, then what sense can we attach to the notion of gaining knowledge by introspection? We can speak of gaining knowledge only in cases where it makes sense to speak of thinking wrongly that we have gained knowledge. In the words of the slogan: "If you can't be wrong, you can't be right either." If failure is logically impossible, then talk of success is meaningless.

What I think is at bottom the same argument may be put in another way. Introspective apprehension or awareness, like all other apprehension, is an apprehension that the thing apprehended is *of a certain sort.* The apprehension involves *classifying* the experience, in however rudimentary a way; that is, it involves the application of *concepts.* Now, surely, the notions of classifying and misclassifying are co-ordinate notions; surely the one can apply only when it is meaningful to apply the other? We can apply a certain concept to our experience only if it is possible to withhold that concept. Yet, according to the doctrine of incorrigibility, the application of any concept except the concept we do apply is logically impossible. (Lying is no exception, for lying is uttering words *contra mentem.* In our minds, we are applying the right concept.)

4. My final argument against the indubitability of introspection runs as follows. (This argument was hit upon independently, at almost the same time, by J. J. C. Smart. See his reply to Baier in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, loc. cit.*) The acquiring of introspective knowledge must consist of the making of (sincere) reports of current mental occurrences, or else a nonverbal apprehension of these occurrences. In both cases the apprehension of the occurrence will have to be *distinct* from the occurrence that is apprehended. But if this is granted, then we can apply Hume's argument about "distinct existences." Wherever we have two distinct things, Hume points out, there we can always conceive of the one existing in the absence of the other. It follows that it is logically possible to have a sincere report of a current inner experience, or a nonverbal apprehension of that experience, without the experience existing. ("Apprehension," of course, is a success-word, and strictly it would be out of place

here. But it would be possible for there to be something just like the apprehension, except that the object of the apprehension did not exist.) But this state of affairs would be the state in which we would be mistaken about our current inner mental state. Incidentally, this argument, if valid, would also prove that the experiences reported or apprehended might exist without being reported or apprehended, although they might not then be called "experiences." I shall return to this point at the end of the paper.

Now in the case of *reports* of mental states, it must surely be conceded that the report is perfectly distinct from the state reported on. Otherwise we are not *reporting*. But the point may not be readily conceded in the case of nonverbal apprehension. To have a pain, it may be said, is to apprehend that we are in pain: to distinguish between the inner state and the apprehension of it is to be guilty of a false abstraction. And then it may be said that it is the presence of this apprehension—and so, *ipso facto*, this mental state—that makes a report of a current mental state a *sincere* report.

But, in fact, the apprehension of something must be distinct from the thing apprehended. For if not, we are faced with a flagrant circularity. Having a pain logically involves apprehension of—what? The pain itself! This is as bad as saying that to be a cat logically involves being the offspring of cats. It seems, therefore, that there must always be a distinction between *being* in a certain mental state and *being aware* that we are in that state. Hence there can be no indubitable introspective knowledge.

III

At this point, somebody may concede that it has been proved that no introspective awareness can be logically guaranteed to be free from mistake, but still maintain that we have a logically privileged access to our own inner states. It may be maintained, that is, that we are the logically ultimate authorities on our inner states, even while it is allowed that even we can be mistaken.

It seems clear, however, that this compromise is inadmissible. Once it has been admitted that I can be wrong about my current inner states, then we must allow the possibility that somebody

else (for example, a brain technician) reaches a true belief about my inner state when I reach a false one. And then what reason is there to deny that the technician is a better authority on my mental state than I am? Indeed, once it is conceded that the apprehension of a mental state is something distinct from the mental state itself, is it not logically possible that others should have *direct* knowledge of my mental states, unmediated by observation of behavior or states of the brain? And if they are right where I am wrong, would they not be better authorities on my mental state than I am? So Ayer's compromise fails.

IV

I now consider objections that may be made to what has been said so far.

1. Somebody may object: "What would it be like to be mistaken about our current inner states? Only if you can *describe cases* where we would be inclined to say that introspective error had occurred will your position appear to have any plausibility."

Now there do seem to be cases where we are confused about the nature of our current experiences, and we could quite plausibly construe some of these as cases where error occurred. But these empirical cases are not very satisfactory for our purpose here, because it is not often plausible to regard them as involving *major* error about the nature of our mental experiences. So here it is better to consider imaginary cases. Consider again the case of a brain technician who has a perfect understanding of the correlation between states of my brain and inner experiences. Suppose, then, that I report, "I seem to be seeing something green," using the sentence as a phenomenological report on my visual experience. The brain technician is able to say from his knowledge of brain patterns that (i) I am not lying; (ii) my brain is in the appropriate state for some *other* experience; (iii) there are disturbances in the brain processes responsible for introspective awareness which would account for my mistake. On the evidence offered by the technician it ought to be concluded that I have made a mistake.

It may be objected to this example that there is no reason why

we should side with the brain technician. If the brain technician and I disagree, should we not rather conclude that there is something wrong with brain theory? There is no doubt that this is a *possible* rejoinder, and that if brain theory were not well founded it would be the *rational* rejoinder; but why is it the rejoinder that we *must* accept? Any hypothesis whatever may be "protected" if we are prepared to make a sufficient number of *ad hoc* assumptions, but to protect a hypothesis indefinitely is not a rational attitude. The fact that we *could* cling to every deliverance of introspection even against the best-attested brain theory does nothing to show that it would be incorrect to side with the brain technician. In fact, I think it *would* be rational to side with him against the deliverance of introspection, provided that brain theory was well founded. This does not mean that we logically must accept the evidence of the brain technician. But there is no logically absolute need to accept the deliverance of introspection either.

It is true, of course, that the brain technician would have to build up his theory in the first place by accepting people's introspective reports and correlating them with brain states. But a well-established brain theory could still be used to cast doubt on some of these introspective reports. In the same way, our knowledge of the physical world is got by perception but this does not prevent us casting doubt on some perceptions.

Consider another case. I say perfectly sincerely, "I am in great pain." A little later I inquire why nobody gave me any assistance or sympathy when I shrieked out "I am in great pain" and exhibited every sign of distress. It is then proved to me that I said the words in a quiet, level voice while exhibiting every sign of relaxation. Might it not be reasonable to conclude that I was mistaken in thinking myself to be in pain? Perhaps other explanations are possible, but I cannot see why this explanation is not also possible.

It may be objected at this point that if extraordinary situations like the two I have just considered were to arise, we should not be so much convinced of introspective error as reduced to a state of total confusion. If evidence seems to suggest that I can be wrong in thinking I am in violent pain now, or that I seem to see

something green, then the possibility of rational discourse has ceased. The conceptual reorganization necessary to accommodate such error would burst our system of thought.

I have some sympathy with this point, but I do not think that it does anything to prove the incorrigibility of current introspective reports. The discovery that I was under an illusion in thinking that I now have two hands or, still better, that I now have a head on my shoulders, would be an even greater shock to thought and the conceptual system. But surely it is clear that the statements "I have two hands now" or "I have a head" are not *logically* indubitable?

2. I pass on to consider another difficulty. It may be objected that if somebody denies that the report "I am in pain now" is indubitable, then he will be forced to admit indubitability at the next level. For if "I am in pain now" is not indubitable, then it must be admitted that "It seems to me that I am in pain now" *is* indubitable. But once indubitability is admitted anywhere (the objection goes on) there is no point in denying it to the original report.

It must be admitted, I think, that if we deny the indubitability of current introspective reports then we must say that a sentence like "It seems to me that I am in pain" has a clear and intelligible meaning. Indeed, it will have *two* possible uses. The phrase "It seems to me" might function simply as an *expression* of an inclination to assert the statement "I am in pain now." In that case no question of truth or falsity will arise, except about the report "I am in pain now," and so no question of indubitability will arise either. However, the whole sentence might also function as a phenomenological report on my belief in the truth of the report "I am in pain now." But why need we say that this report of our belief in the truth of an introspective report is *indubitable*? It need be no more than *true*.[1]

When Descartes set out to examine his thoughts, to see if any were indubitable, he *presupposed* that he had these thoughts, for he could not examine his thoughts unless he had some to examine! But this did not make his statement "I am thinking now" a

[1] I owe this point to Mr. J. E. McGechie.

logically indubitable one. It was simply a logical presupposition of his starting point. In the same way, if it is *given* that I make the sincere report "I am in pain now," then that *presupposes* that I believe that I am in pain now. But that does not make the statement "I believe that I am in pain now" an indubitable one. It is simply a logical presupposition of the given starting point: a statement of what is in fact the case.

I suggest, then, that there is no *logical* objection to the introspective awareness of experiences, to the simultaneous introspective awareness of that awareness, and so on as far as we please. This will always involve an ultimate awareness that is not itself an *object* of awareness,[2] but it will not involve a logically guaranteed freedom from error at any point. How far such awarenesss goes *in fact* is an empirical question, to which the answer seems to be "Not very far." We can speak of awareness of awareness of awareness of awareness of awareness of . . . *X*, but no psychological reality seems to correspond to our words.

3. Now, however, it may be objected that if introspective reports about our current inner state are not indubitable, then they really lack any authority with us. For there is no way empirically available of checking whether I introspect correctly or not. Without such a check, and without indubitability, how can I claim *knowledge*? Yet in fact we are perfectly happy to talk of introspective *reports*, of *knowledge* gained by introspective *reports*, or of *knowledge* gained by introspection.

I do not believe that this objection is very serious. In the first place, there is some rough-and-ready check on introspective statements provided by observable behavior. If a man thinks that he currently experiences a spurt of hatred for another, he may later be inclined to withdraw this when he observes that his own *actions* are much more easily squared with the assumption that he fears the other, or that he loves him. In the second place, I see no reason why a faculty whose operation cannot be checked by other people, or by the same person with a different faculty, should not yield us knowledge. I think we *know* that, by and large, introspection yields us reliable information, just as sense

[2] This is the "systematic elusiveness" of the subject.

perception does. And if I am asked to back up this claim by reasons, then I think little more can be said except that this is the place where reasons stop. After all, reasons always have to stop somewhere, sooner or later.

4. Here is the place to show that our theory of introspection solves the problem about how we teach children to speak about inner mental states, and how we, as children, learned to speak about such states.

Since it is simply an *empirical* fact that we have no direct awareness of other people's inner states, we can use the traditional inductive argument for their existence.[3] If a child cries, and has a splinter in his finger, I can assume on an inductive basis, ultimately based on my own case, that the child feels a pain in his finger. If his eyes are open, he has red spectacles on, and is looking at a white object, then I can assume that, in all likelihood, he is having sense impressions as of something red. I can therefore introduce such phrases as "pain in your finger" and "looks red *to you*, although it is not red." Further testing in similar situations will tell me whether or not the child has "caught on." Once I am fairly sure he has understood, I can then trust him, and he can trust himself, when he reports pain in the absence of any observed injury, or reports sense impressions as of something red in the absence of normal "red-look-producing conditions."

Once we realize that our mental experiences are not logically impervious to any apprehension except our own, then all Wittgenstein's difficulties about "private objects" are swept away. Suppose everybody had a beetle in a box, and nobody could, as a matter of empirical fact, observe the other man's beetle. Provided we could observe the outside of the boxes, and provided that these outsides exhibited characteristic marks of beetle-occupation (a correlation discovered in our own case), there would be no *special* difficulty in introducing the word "beetle" into the language.

5. Finally, it may be asked, if it is true that no introspective

[3] I believe, in fact, that a fuller account of the concept of a mental state than I can give here would show that our assurance of the existence of other minds is even better than that afforded by the inductive argument. But it is worth seeing that there is nothing wrong with the inductive argument.

reports are indubitable, why did any philosophers so much as conceive the idea that these reports were in a specially privileged position? I will suggest two reasons.

In the first place (following Wittgenstein, but not following him the whole way), I think we must recognize that sentences like "I am in pain now," "It looks green to me now," "I want an apple now," and so forth, are not always used to make introspective reports. The sentence "I am in pain now" can be a substitute for a groan, a wince, or a cry for help. To say "It looks green to me now" is usually to express a tentative belief, or inclination to believe, that something in the physical environment is green. The sentence is not normally used to make a phenomenological report on our visual impressions. To say "I want an apple now" is normally to give expression to my desire for an apple; it is not to make an introspective report on my current desires.

Now in so far as these sentences have these noncognitive uses, so far it *makes no sense* to speak of cognitive error. This may be put in a misleading way by saying that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such utterances. It is misleading because we are then tempted to think that here we have an utterance which, if uttered sincerely, embodies knowledge of a quite peculiar certainty.

So, when philosophers have considered sentences like "I am in pain now," they have been misled by their ambiguity. They have moved between their noncognitive use, where the question of intellectual mistake does not come up but equally there is no question of cognition, and their autobiographical use, where there is no doubt cognitive certainty but simply an *empirical* certainty. And so we persuade ourselves that such sentences express reports, but reports that have a special certainty and special authority. This confusion is made all the more easy because the utterance of such a sentence regularly *intertwines* both noncognitive and reporting functions. But, in truth, in so far as "I am in pain now" is a report, it is subject to the possibility of doubt, and so far as it is indubitable it is not a report at all.

In the second place, our unwillingness to admit that there can

be error with respect to first-person reports of our current experiences may also reflect certain emotional attachments. We have a deep interest in *ourselves*, as opposed to other people and other things. This is the basis of the utterly natural fantasy "Nobody and nothing exists except myself." Not only do we have a special interest in ourselves, however, but we attach a quite peculiar importance to our own *experiences*. We feel that when we started experiencing, the world began; and when we stop experiencing, it will end. We feel that, whatever the world is really like, provided our experiences remain the same then *it does not matter*. (This is one of the psychological roots of phenomenalism.)

We also have a deep interest in the *present* state of the world as a whole, as opposed to its past or future. What happens now is more important than what happened in the past, or what will happen next. We have the feeling that, compared with the present, the past and the future are not so real, do not really exist. The biological reasons for this concentration of our interest on *ourselves* and on the *present* are of course perfectly obvious.

In the case of current inner experiences, our interest in our own experiences and our interest in the present *come together*. Our own current experiences are the things we are interested in above everything else. Perhaps this helps to explain our peculiar unwillingness to admit the possibility that we are mistaken about inner experiences at the instant of having them.

V

I will finish this paper by considering briefly whether our denial of the incorrigibility of current introspective reports forces us to admit the possibility of experiences that are *not* apprehended.

If we consider such phrases as "mental *experiences*" or "inner *experiences*" then it seems natural to say that these are the tautological accusatives of "inner sense," just as sights are the tautological accusatives of the sense of vision. If this is correct, or if it is adopted as a rule of language, then it makes no sense to speak of inner *experiences* of which we are not aware.

But this only postpones the real question. For we can now ask:

"Are the happenings of which we are introspectively aware—such things as pains, sense impressions, mental images, and so forth—*necessarily* experiences, or can they exist when we are not aware of them?" And here, I think, we have to make a linguistic decision. We can legislate in favor of saying that having a pain, a sense impression, or an image *is* to have an experience, that is, something of which we must be aware. Or, perhaps more wisely, we can legislate in the other way.

For suppose that we decide that pains, sense impressions, images, and so forth must be apprehended; the logical possibility must still be admitted of inner happenings which resemble the having of pains, sense impressions, and so forth in *all* respects except that of being objects of introspective awareness. For if introspective awareness and its objects are "distinct existences," as we have argued, it must be possible for the objects to exist when the awareness does not exist.

Nor need we restrict ourselves to bare logical possibility, for there are plenty of empirical cases which can be naturally interpreted as involving the existence of inner states of which we are not aware. Consider the case of the patient who struggles and screams under nitrous oxide. Perhaps we do not want to say that he is *in pain*, on the ground that he is not aware of being in pain. But he is exhibiting pain behavior, and it is at least a natural induction to say that this is caused by certain inner states which resemble the mental experience of being in pain, except for the fact that they are *not* experienced. To say that nothing but *mere* pain behavior can possibly be involved seems to be nothing but an exhibition that one is prisoner of a dogma.

Again, consider the interesting case of the chicken-sexer. He can, more or less accurately, say that a chicken will grow up to be a cock or a hen, but he does not know, and nobody else knows, what visual cues he is using. (Chicken-sexers are trained by being shown photos of chicks whose later career is known. They are told when they guess correctly, and they gradually come to guess better and better.) It is natural to say that female and male chicks give rise to different inner states resembling visual impressions in the chicken-sexer, and that these inner states are responsible for the sexer's choice, but yet that the

sexer is not directly aware of these states. We may deny that these inner states are *sense impressions*, on the verbal ground that one must be aware of one's own sense impressions, but there is no reason why they should not have every property of sense impressions except that of being objects of awareness. And once we see this point, I do not think that we will be particularly zealous to keep words like "sense impression" solely for inner states that *are* apprehended.

I conclude that not only is it a mistake to say that introspective reports are indubitable or have a logically special authority, but also that the objects of introspective awareness can exist when we are not aware of them.

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