From: N <N@nyu.edu>
To: jim.pryor@nyu.edu
Subject: Question
Date: Thursday, November 16, 2017 12:33 PM

On Thu, Nov 16, 2017, at 12:32 PM, N wrote:
> Hey N,

Hi N.

> Is it effective to define genuine memories in terms of experiences when
> assessing whether you and Dr. Evil's subject have the same personal
> identity? 

It's not clear to me what you mean here by "effective".

> For example, if two people have the same genuine memories, then
> they have all the same experiences.

I'm not sure about this. We might have all the same genuine memories, but
perhaps I had some experience E1 which I forgot about so no longer remember,
and you had some experience E2 which you forgot about. And E1 may be different
from E2. So we might right now have all the same genuine memories, but some of
the experiences we in fact had in the past were different.

> If they have all the same
> experiences, then they are in the same location at this moment because
> all of their previous experiences have led them to be at the same
> position in space right now.

Ah I see what you are thinking. I guess this could be confusing. When
philosophers say "the same person" or "the same boat" or things like that, they
usually mean one and the same (that is, a numerically identical) person or
boat. When they say "the same belief" or "the same experience" or "the same
memory" or "the same haircut", they mean that the subjects have the same KIND
of belief/experience/memory/haircut. There could be TWO experiences --- your
experience and my experience --- but they're being claimed to be experiences OF
THE SAME KIND.

I hope that helps.

-- 
Jim Pryor
NYU Dept of Philosophy