This page aims to collect papers by those prosecuting, or responding to, the Bayesian-inspired objections to dogmatism found for example in White 2006. I'm not sure who if anyone deserves credit for first crafting these objections; early versions of them had been circulating in emails and conversations since 2000 or so. In 2004 a number of papers published the objections; White's paper was written during that same period but appeared later.
My own view, developed in Problems for Credulism is that the objections are just symptoms of a general limit on Bayesian models of undermining defeat. I think the same idea is developed with different emphasis by Christensen 19xx and Weisberg 20xx.
Hawthorne, John. Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford (2004), at pp. 73-77.
Schiffer, Stephen. "Skepticism and the vagaries of justified belief" Phil Studies 119 (2004), 161-84.
Williamson, Timothy. "Skepticism", in F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds) The Oxford Companion to Analytical Philosophy, Oxford (2004).
Cohen, Stuart. "Why basic knowledge is easy knowledge", PPR 70 (2005), 417-30.
White, Roger. "Problems for dogmatism" Phil Studies 131 (2006), 525-57.
Wright, Crispin. "The perils of dogmatism" in S. Nuccetelli and H. Seay (eds) Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford (2007).
Silins, Nico. "Bayesian justification and the Moorean response to the skeptic", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2 (2008).
Kung, Peter. "On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation", Synthese 177 (2010), 1-17.
Weatherson, Brian. "The Bayesian and the dogmatist", PAS 107 (2007), 169-85.
Willenken, Tim. "Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense", Phil Studies 154 (2011), 1-25.
Valaris, Markos. "Dogmatism and Moorean reasoning", ms.