X-Git-Url: http://lambda.jimpryor.net/git/gitweb.cgi?p=lambda.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=week3.mdwn;h=39e472bf9a644c1bdac774790ed134f26ab7cf31;hp=c66526d3c61bc9267d5aaba6b569b2c5f89be230;hb=9a815152fb9ad1fa4ee5778376dc59007cc687f3;hpb=df8bd50a5d83e9b3f4086d1cb944a603d77181a7 diff --git a/week3.mdwn b/week3.mdwn index c66526d3..39e472bf 100644 --- a/week3.mdwn +++ b/week3.mdwn @@ -1,3 +1,12 @@ +[[!toc]] + +##More on evaluation strategies## + +Here are notes on [[evaluation order]] that make the choice of which +lambda to reduce next the selection of a route through a network of +links. + + ##Computing the length of a list## How could we compute the length of a list? Without worrying yet about what lambda-calculus implementation we're using for the list, the basic idea would be to define this recursively: @@ -211,7 +220,8 @@ Instead of writing out a long formula twice, we could write: and the initial `(\x. x x)` is just what we earlier called the ω combinator (lower-case omega, not the non-terminating Ω). So the self-application of `H` can be written: -
ω (\h \lst. (isempty lst) zero (add one ((h h) (extract-tail lst))))
+
ω (\h \lst. (isempty lst) zero (add one ((h h) (extract-tail lst))))
+
and this will indeed implement the recursive function we couldn't earlier figure out how to define. @@ -414,7 +424,7 @@ to *the tail* of the list we were evaluating its application to at the previous ##Fixed-point Combinators Are a Bit Intoxicating## -![tatoo](/y-combinator.jpg) +![tatoo](/y-combinator-fixed.jpg) There's a tendency for people to say "Y-combinator" to refer to fixed-point combinators generally. We'll probably fall into that usage ourselves. Speaking correctly, though, the Y-combinator is only one of many fixed-point combinators. @@ -435,15 +445,15 @@ For those of you who like to watch ultra slow-mo movies of bullets piercing apples, here's a stepwise computation of the application of a recursive function. We'll use a function `sink`, which takes one argument. If the argument is boolean true (i.e., `\x y.x`), it -returns itself (a copy of `sink`); if the argument is boolean false, -it returns I. That is, we want the following behavior: +returns itself (a copy of `sink`); if the argument is boolean false +(`\x y. y`), it returns `I`. That is, we want the following behavior: sink false ~~> I sink true false ~~> I sink true true false ~~> I sink true true true false ~~> I -So we make sink = Y (\f b. b f I): +So we make `sink = Y (\f b. b f I)`: 1. sink false 2. Y (\fb.bfI) false @@ -485,3 +495,146 @@ the behavior of `sink` is sensitive to the nature of the input: if the input is the magic function `false`, the self-regeneration machinery will be discarded, and the recursion will stop. +That's about as simple as recursion gets. + +##Base cases, and their lack## + +As any functional programmer quickly learns, writing a recursive +function divides into two tasks: figuring out how to handle the +recursive case, and remembering to insert a base case. The +interesting and enjoyable part is figuring out the recursive pattern, +but the base case cannot be ignored, since leaving out the base case +creates a program that runs forever. For instance, consider computing +a factorial: `n!` is `n * (n-1) * (n-2) * ... * 1`. The recursive +case says that the factorial of a number `n` is `n` times the +factorial of `n-1`. But if we leave out the base case, we get + + 3! = 3 * 2! = 3 * 2 * 1! = 3 * 2 * 1 * 0! = 3 * 2 * 1 * 0 * -1! ... + +That's why it's crucial to declare that 0! = 1, in which case the +recursive rule does not apply. In our terms, + + fac = Y (\fac n. iszero n 1 (fac (predecessor n))) + +If `n` is 0, `fac` reduces to 1, without computing the recursive case. + +There is a well-known problem in philosophy and natural language +semantics that has the flavor of a recursive function without a base +case: the truth-teller paradox (and related paradoxes). + +(1) This sentence is true. + +If we assume that the complex demonstrative "this sentence" can refer +to (1), then the proposition expressed by (1) will be true just in +case the thing referred to by *this sentence* is true. Thus (1) will +be true just in case (1) is true, and (1) is true just in case (1) is +true, and so on. If (1) is true, then (1) is true; but if (1) is not +true, then (1) is not true. + +Without pretending to give a serious analysis of the paradox, let's +assume that sentences can have for their meaning boolean functions +like the ones we have been working with here. Then the sentence *John +is John* might denote the function `\x y. x`, our `true`. + +Then (1) denotes a function from whatever the referent of *this +sentence* is to a boolean. So (1) denotes `\f. f true false`, where +the argument `f` is the referent of *this sentence*. Of course, if +`f` is a boolean, `f true false <~~> f`, so for our purposes, we can +assume that (1) denotes the identity function `I`. + +If we use (1) in a context in which *this sentence* refers to the +sentence in which the demonstrative occurs, then we must find a +meaning `m` such that `I m = I`. But since in this context `m` is the +same as the meaning `I`, so we have `m = I m`. In other words, `m` is +a fixed point for the denotation of the sentence (when used in the +appropriate context). + +That means that in a context in which *this sentence* refers to the +sentence in which it occurs, the sentence denotes a fixed point for +the identity function. Here's a fixed point for the identity +function: + +
Y I
+(\f. (\h. f (h h)) (\h. f (h h))) I
+(\h. I (h h)) (\h. I (h h)))
+(\h. (h h)) (\h. (h h)))
+ω ω
+&Omega
+
+ +Oh. Well! That feels right. The meaning of *This sentence is true* +in a context in which *this sentence* refers to the sentence in which +it occurs is Ω, our prototypical infinite loop... + +What about the liar paradox? + +(2) This sentence is false. + +Used in a context in which *this sentence* refers to the utterance of +(2) in which it occurs, (2) will denote a fixed point for `\f.neg f`, +or `\f l r. f r l`, which is the `C` combinator. So in such a +context, (2) might denote + + Y C + (\f. (\h. f (h h)) (\h. f (h h))) I + (\h. C (h h)) (\h. C (h h))) + C ((\h. C (h h)) (\h. C (h h))) + C (C ((\h. C (h h))(\h. C (h h)))) + C (C (C ((\h. C (h h))(\h. C (h h))))) + ... + +And infinite sequence of `C`s, each one negating the remainder of the +sequence. Yep, that feels like a reasonable representation of the +liar paradox. + +See Barwise and Etchemendy's 1987 OUP book, [The Liar: an essay on +truth and circularity](http://tinyurl.com/2db62bk) for an approach +that is similar, but expressed in terms of non-well-founded sets +rather than recursive functions. + +##However...## + +You should be cautious about feeling too comfortable with +these results. Thinking again of the truth-teller paradox, yes, +Ω is *a* fixed point for `I`, and perhaps it has +some a privileged status among all the fixed points for `I`, being the +one delivered by Y and all (though it is not obvious why Y should have +any special status). + +But one could ask: look, literally every formula is a fixed point for +`I`, since + + X <~~> I X + +for any choice of X whatsoever. + +So the Y combinator is only guaranteed to give us one fixed point out +of infinitely many---and not always the intuitively most useful +one. (For instance, the squaring function has zero as a fixed point, +since 0 * 0 = 0, and 1 as a fixed point, since 1 * 1 = 1, but `Y +(\x. mul x x)` doesn't give us 0 or 1.) So with respect to the +truth-teller paradox, why in the reasoning we've +just gone through should we be reaching for just this fixed point at +just this juncture? + +One obstacle to thinking this through is the fact that a sentence +normally has only two truth values. We might consider instead a noun +phrase such as + +(3) the entity that this noun phrase refers to + +The reference of (3) depends on the reference of the embedded noun +phrase *this noun phrase*. It's easy to see that any object is a +fixed point for this referential function: if this pen cap is the +referent of *this noun phrase*, then it is the referent of (3), and so +for any object. + +The chameleon nature of (3), by the way (a description that is equally +good at describing any object), makes it particularly well suited as a +gloss on pronouns such as *it*. In the system of +[Jacobson 1999](http://www.springerlink.com/content/j706674r4w217jj5/), +pronouns denote (you guessed it!) identity functions... + +Ultimately, in the context of this course, these paradoxes are more +useful as a way of gaining leverage on the concepts of fixed points +and recursion, rather than the other way around.